Sharron Kathleen Robertson v. Donald Lee Robertson : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1978
Sharron Kathleen Robertson v. Donald Lee
Robertson : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
P. Keith Nelson; George Sutton; Attorneys for Respondent;
Paul N. Cotro-Manes; Attorney for Appellant;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Robertson v. Robertson, No. 15719 (Utah Supreme Court, 1978).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/1202
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SHARRON KATHLEEN ROBERTSON, 
Plaintiff and Respondant, 
vs. Civil No. 15719 
DONALD LEE ROBERTSON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM DECREE OF DIVORCE OF THE 
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY 
HON. J. ROBERT BULLOCK, JUDGE 
P. KEITH NELSON 
GEORGE SUTTON 
48 Post Office Place 
P. O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Attorneys for Respondant 
PAUL N. COTRO-MANES 
430 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS . 
POINT ONE - THE COUF.T ERRED IN REQUIRING DEFENDANT 
TO PAY ALLEGED CERTAIN DEBTS 
POINT TWO - THE COURT ERRED IN SIGNING FINDINGS 
OF FACT WHICH WERE AT VARIANCE WITH 
ITS MEMORANDUM DECISION 
SUMMARY 
CITATIONS 
Baker vs. baker, (1976, Utah) 551 P.2d 1263 . 
Boyer Company vs. Lignel, et 11, ( 19 77, Utah) 
1 
1 
1 
3 
8 
10 
6 
567 P.2d 1112 9 
Carter vs. Collins, (1935, Okla) 50 P.2d 203 . 7 
Clawson vs. Boston Acme Mines Development Company, 
72 U. 137, 269 P. 147 5 
English vs. English, (1977, Utah) 565 P.2d 409 6 
Gray Realty Co. vs. Robinson, 111 U. 521, 
184 P.2d 237 8 
Quitmeyer vs. Theroux, (1964, Mont) 395 P.2d 965. 7 
Snyder vs. Clune, 15 U.2d 254, 390 P.2d 915 . 5 
Thoroas vs. Thomas, (1977, Utah) 569 P.2d 1119 9 
Westenskow vs. Westenskow, (1977, Utah) 562 P.2d 1256 6 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended: 
78-12-25 (1) 5 
Utah Rules of Civl Procedure: 
Rule 15 (b) 5 
Rule 52(a) 9 
Rule 52(b) 10 
i 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
OTHER AUTHORITY 
51 Am Jur 2d 593, Limitation of Actions §4 
17 Ruling Case Law, 668 . 
ii 
7 
7 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
rn THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
SHARRON KATHLEEN ROBERTSON, 
Plaintiff and Respondant,) 
vs. 
DONALD LEE ROBERTSON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE 
Civil No. 15719 
This is an appeal by the defendant, Donald Lee Robertson 
from the decree of divorce entered on the 22nd day of February, 
1978, by the Honorable J. Robert Bullock, Judge of the 
Fourth Judicial District Court in ar.d for Uintah County, 
State of Utah whereby defendant seeks to have the Decree of 
Divorce amended with respect to the equity in certain real 
property. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court granted plaintiff a decree of divorce 
from defendant and awarded to the plaintiff certain real and 
personal property and ordered the defendant to pay support, 
alimony, and the debts incurred by the parties during their 
marriage. 
STATEMENT OF TP..E ~ACTS 
Plaintiff and defendant were married in May, 1970 and 
had two children as issue of the marriage and acquired a 
home in Vernal, Utah, where they resided at the time of the 
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filing of the divorce action. (R. 1) 
Plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce on the 27th day 
of September, 1977, (R. 1) and simultaneously filed an 
affidavit in support of a motion for an order to show cause 
to which was attached a list of the amount of money allegedly 
necessary to support the plainitff pending a determination 
of the action and a list of all the debts owed by the parties. 
(R. 4, 5, 6). 
Defendant having been served with summons he filed his 
answer on or about the 17th day of October, 1977, (R. 12, R. 
13). Thereafter, in preparation for trial the defendant 
filed a statement of assets and liabilities on January 27, 
1978 (R. 23, 24, 25). 
The matter was tried before the Honorable J. Robert 
Bullock sitting without jury on the 24th day of January, 
1978, whereupon after having heard testimony, received 
evidence, and argument of counsel he took the matter under 
advisement and en the 27th day of January, 1978, rendered 
his memorandum decision. (R. 28, 29). Thereafter, plaintiff's 
counsel prepared findings of fact and conclusions of law and 
decree of divorce and submitted them to the court for its 
signature which were signed on or about the 21st day of 
February, 1978 (R. 30-36). 
On March 2, 1978, defendant served his notice of appeal 
which was filed with the Clerk of Court on March 7, 1978 (R. 
27). 
The defendant specifically appeals from the Court's 
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decision as it relates to the allowance of certain obligations 
as debts of the parties to be paid by the defendant and to 
the distribution of the equity in the real property under 
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree which 
are in conflict with the memorandum decision rendered by the 
Court. 
POINT ONE 
THE COURT ERRED IN REQUIRING DEFENDANT TO PAY ALLEGED 
CERTAIN DEBTS. 
At the time of the commencement of the action the 
plaintiff filed an affidavit to which she attached a list of 
all of the debts and obligations incurred by the parties 
during their marriage. This affidavit failed to allege any 
debts owing to the father, mother or brother of the parties. 
At the time of trial, however, plaintiff testified that her 
father assisted the parties in acquiring a down payment for 
a home in the sum of $2400.00 (R. 56, 57). With respect to 
this loan, she testifed that it was made in March of 1973 
and was oral. She also testified that over $1,000.00 had 
been advanced over a period of the past five or six years to 
plaintiff and defendant by plaintiff's parents (R. 58, 59). 
She went on and testified that when the parties first 
were married they lived with her parents and there were 
advances or loans of between $3,000 to $3,500.00 to them by 
her parents. (R. 60, 61). This was denied by defendant. It 
was not until cross examination that the ti~e frame when 
these advances were made was developed wherein the plaintiff 
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testified that it was in 1970 through November of 1971 (R. 
71) . Defendant moved the court to strike all testimony 
relating to the $2400.00 for the down payment of the home on 
the basis that the statute of limitations had run with 
respect to this debt, also with respect to the borrowings 
from the mother between November, 1970 to October of 1971 
and the $1,000.00 from the father over a period of five to 
six years, all on the basis of the running of the statute 
of limitations (R. 72). The Court denied the motion to 
strike and said: "I am not going to strike the testimony, 
but I'll take that into consideration when I'm deciding the 
case." (R. 72). 
The Court when it made its decision ruled that a 
"reasonable credit attributable to plaintiff's parents and 
other relatives on account of contributions to the parties 
during their marriage for the down payment, rent, living 
expenses, etc. is the sum of $7,500.00. (R. 28) The Court 
went on and said: 
"It is reasonable and proper that the net equity after 
adjustment for contributions of plaintiff's parents and 
other relatives be divided equally between the parties." 
In the pleadings, no allegation was made by the plaintiff 
at the time of the filing of her complaint, or her affidavit 
in support of her motion for an order to show cause anything 
at all with respect to the alleged indebtedness due to her 
parents. Consequently, the defendant when he filed his 
answer did not affirmatively allege the running of the 
statute of limitations, because nothing was plead with 
-4-
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respect to any indebtedness which would be barred by the 
statute of limitations. 
At the time of trial, however, plaintiff testified to 
these matters and after the dates were ascertained as to 
when the indebtedness were incurred, the defendant moved to 
strike the testimony. No motion pursuant to Rule 15(b), to 
amend the pleadings, was made by the plaintiff. 
78-12-25(1), UCA, 1953, as amended (statute of limitations) 
provides: 
"Within four years; (1) an action upon a contract, 
obligation or liability not founded upon an instrument 
in writing." 
The uncontroverted facts in this case show that the 
statute of limitations had run with respect to each and 
every one of the alleged indebtedness due to the parents of 
the plaintiff. The defendant, having raised the issue of 
the running of the statute of limitations shifted the burden 
onto the plaintiff to show, affirmatively, that the statute 
of limitation had not run or that the running of the statute 
was tolled by some act or conduct. Clawson vs. Boston Acme Mines 
Development Company, 72 U. 137, 269 P. 147; Snyder v. Clune, 
15 U.2d 254, 390 P.2d 915. 
The Court clearly erred when it did not take into 
consideration the running of the statute of limitations as 
~o the claimed indebtedness of the parties. 
It is not disputed that the Court, in exercising its 
discretionary powers with respect to divorce and divorce 
settlements may order one party to discharge the indebtedness 
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incurred by the parties during their marriage, however, that 
discretionary power cannot be invoked to compel the re-
institution of a debt which is no longer viable in the law. 
In the recent case of Westenskow vs. Westenskow, (1977, 
Utah) 562 P.2d 1256 the Supreme Court of Utah affirmed the 
Court's decree off-setting indebtedness due to family 
members, however, the Court observed: 
"The Court further stated one of the reasons plaintiff 
was granted the lien en the home was the alleged debt 
to his grandmother. It was questioned whether this 
debt would ever be paid, but the distribution was made 
on the basis it was a valid obligation." (Emphasis 
mine) 
In the case now at bar, the obligations owing to the 
parents of the plaintiff are not valid obligations by reason 
of the fact that they are barred by the statute cf limitation 
and therefore the Court clearly erred in allowing an off-set 
of $7500.00 against the equity that the parties had in the 
real property. 
The Utah Courts have long held that the Court has 
discretion to order one party to pay debts incurred by the 
parties during their marriage and that such order is not an 
abuse of discretion, however, where it is shown that the 
Court misapplied the law resulting in substantial and 
prejudicial error such a decree of divorce will be modifed 
upon appeal. Baker vs. Baker, (1976 Utah) 551 P.2d 1263. 
of English vs Engl!3il The Supreme Court of Utah in the case 
(1977, Utah) 565 P.2d 409 observed: 
"The trial court, in a divorce action, has considerable I 
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latitude of discretion in adjusting financial and 
property interest. A party appealing therefrom has the 
burden to prove there was a misunderstanding or misapplication 
of the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial 
error; or the evidence clearly preponderated against 
the findings; or such a serious inequity has resulted 
as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion." 
The law throughout the United States is clear that the 
defense of the Statute of Limitations is a right to which 
all men are enticled to invoke, and that it is favored by 
the Courts. Quitrneyer v. Theroux, (Mont. 1964) 395 P.2d 
965. In an earlier Oklahoma case, Carter v. Collins, 
(Okla, 1935) 50 P.2d 203, in quoting from 17 R.C.L. 668 it 
was stated: 
"As a general rule, however, statutes of limitations 
are now considered as wise and beneficent in their 
purpose and tendency, and as furnishing a defense as 
meritorious as any other and one to which all men are 
entitled as a right." 
the legal work 51 Am Jur 2d 593, Limitation of Actions, §4 
states: 
"The right to assert the statute of limitations as a 
complete defense is considered to be property within 
the protection of a constitutional guaranty of due 
process of law." 
The trial court recognized the existence of the legal 
effect of the Statute of Limitations when it observed: 
"The amount paid to her mother for board and room 
or whatever it was during the period they lived there 
and the amount davanced (Sic) by her father and her 
brother for living expenses, et cetera, it's true I 
think that if they were bringing the action there would 
be no recovery, because I think it would be barred by 
the statutes of limitations." 
(R.84--TR 39) 
However, in spite of the statute of limitations the 
Court did totally ignore the effect of the statute when it 
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made its final ruling and this was error and abuse of discreti~ 
to reinstate a claim of the plaintiff's parents and award to 
the plaintiff from the equity in the real property enough 
money to satisfy the purported claims of the parents. 
In the case of Gray Realty Co. v. Robinson, lll U 521, 
184 P.2d 237, the S~preme Court in speaking of the statute 
of limitations observed: 
"Section 104-2-23, which can be designated as a general 
statute of limitations, is a statute of repo.se enacted 
as a matter of public policy to fix a limit with which 
an action must be brought or the obligation is preswned 
to have been paid. The underlying purpose is to 
prevent the unexpected enforcement of stale claims 
concerning which persons interested have been thrown 
off their guard by want of prosecution." 
The attempted enforcement of the claims, some as old as 
eight years, in the divorce action whereby the plaintiff was 
awarded the equity in the home to pay these debts, which is 
highly questionable as to whether she would in fact ever do, 
or be expected to do by her parents, is to say the least the 
"unexpected enforcement of stale claims." 
POINT TWO 
THE COURT ERRED IN SIGNING FINDINGS OF FACT WHICH WERE 
AT VARIANCE WITH ITS MEMORANDUM DECISION. 
The Court in its memorandwn decision provided that the 
equity in the home that was awarded to the defendant was to 
be paid over to him within 18 months of the date of the 
decree (R. 28,29), however the findings of fact as prepared 
by the plaintiff and submitted to the court provided that 
this equity would not be paid over for 18 years. (R. 32) 
This was not the intent of the Court. Furthermore, the 
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findings did not state what was to happen when the plaintiff 
remarried. She did in fact remarry shortly after the divorce 
became final. 
Plaintiff's counsel in preparing the findings of fact 
and conclusions of law saw fit, for their own purposes, to 
amend the Court's decision in this matter, and the Court 
through inadvertence executed che findings of fact and 
conclusions of law and decree presented to it by plaintiff's 
counsel. 
The Judge's memorandum decision in this matter stands 
as a finding of fact within the meaning of Rule 52(a) Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Thomas v. Thomas, (1977, Utah)569 
P.2d 1119. 
It is submitted that when the Court requests the 
prevailing party to draw findings of fact and conclusions of 
law in conformity with his decision that it is encurnbent 
upon counsel in preparing such findings to do so consistent 
with the court's findings. The Utah Court in the case of 
Boyer Company v. Lignel, et al, (1977, Utah) 567 ?.2d 1112 
discusses the mechanical adoption of findings of fact and 
conclusions of law and states: 
"The discretion of adopting the findings as submitted 
to the trial Court is exclusively in that Court as long 
as the findings are not clearly contrary to the evidence." 
In this respect the trial court having made its own findings 
of fact and conclusions with respect to the equities in the 
real property, such findings should have been incorporated 
into the formal findings of fact and conclusions of law as 
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prepared for the Court's signature. 
When counsel for plaintiff was contacted about this 
variance they refused to do anything about making any correction 
As defendant felt that error had been committed with respect 
to the amount of the equity set aside for the benefit of the 
parents of the plaintiff no motion objecting to the findings 
of fact was made and pursuant to rule 52(b), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure no objection or motion to amend is required. 
SUMMARY 
It is respectfully submitted that the Court order that 
the decree of divorce be amended to strike therefrom the 
off-set of $7,500.00 from the equity in the real property, 
and that the said $7,500.00 be divided equally between the 
parties, and that further, the decree be amended to provide 
that the equity due the defendant be paid over to him within 
the 18 months specified in the Memorandum Decision, and for 
costs of appeal. 
~;fffe:_ !' eN. Cotro-Manes 
Attorney for Appellant 
430 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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